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Abstract:   The paper investigates Jamaican Terms of Trade,  the persistence of 
shocks and the nature of the feedback process.  Examination of the autoregressive 
feedback relationship for the period since 1960, suggested that feedbacks were 
significant but  had finite persistence.  However, when allowance was made for a 
structural break the autoregressive effect became insignificant  and the behaviour 
of the NBTT  showed no shock persistence.  The implication drawn from  these 
findings is that trade windfalls should be seen as temporary, so that a Jamaican 
policy response should seek to smooth the  consumption effect.  Government  policy 
in the 1970’s acted as if the positive shock would be persistent and as a 
consequence created a virtual dutch disease scenario. 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
 Jamaica is a small trade-dependent economy with imports standing at over 60% of 
GDP,  as a consequence, changes in the purchasing power of its exports have  
significant implications for  macro performance. Early research on such resource 
economies focused on the extent to which dependence on primary commodities would 
limit growth because the inherent tendency to declining terms of trade would result in 
loss of surplus to the centre  and that general instability in earnings would further 
undermine growth (Prebisch, 1950, Evans,1987).  These perspectives created a view 
that resource abundance may be a poisoned chalice.   This  standard debate  has been 
conducted with reference to the trends in the  Commodity Terms of Trade (CTT) of 
primary: manufactured goods.  This paper  is concerned with the effects of shocks to 
Jamaica’s terms of trade and this requires a measure which captures  country-specific 
trade characteristics.   To achieve this country-specific perspective, the Net Barter 
Terms of Trade (NBTT) offers the appropriate  direct measure.1    Shocks to the 
NBTT influence real purchasing power over imports,  so they impact directly on 
macro performance  and  require policy responses.  Recent work on windfall trade 
shocks has concluded  that the appropriate policy is  conditional on the persistence of 
shocks.  It is generally accepted  that policy should be designed to  sterilise  
temporary shocks  whilst facilitating adjustment to more persistent shocks. ( Gelb 
1988, Roemer 1985,  Auty 1997, 1998,  Auty & Mikesell  2000) 
 
Jamaica  was once the Jewel in the West Indian Crown  endowed with extensive and 
fertile sugar land (Pares 1960, Sheridan 1970, Dunn 1973).  However,  with its 
economy dominated by a sequence of commodities -  sugar, bananas, bauxite, sun and  
sand , it has since succumbed to a series of cycles.   Through the early years of 
independence in the 1960’s , bauxite and tourism came on stream and helped to 
maintain stability in the NBTT by  countering the tendency to adverse commodity 
terms of trade in sugar and bananas.   The early 1970’s  saw positive price changes  
for all the key  commodities and  a  consequent large shock to the  NBTT.  However 
following this brief positive shock Jamaica fell from a relatively high to notably weak 
                                                 
1 Commodity terms of trade refers to the price of primary commodities to the price of manufactures, 
while NBTT is the ratio of a countrys unit export price index to unit import price index , hence it is 
country specific rather than assuming that all low income economies export primary and import 
manufactures in the same proportions, which would be implicit in CTT as a measure of trade shocks to 
an economy.  
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growth path relative to  less well endowed neighbours (Atkins & Boyd 1998,  King 
2001)   
 
The dominant explanation for Jamaica’s  performance switch rests on the economic 
mismanagement and the socialist agendas of the government lead by Michael Manley.  
(King 2001, Stephen & Stephen 1986,  Sharpley  1983).  These may be a part of the 
story, but this paper seeks to widen the picture by considering the switch with 
reference to hypotheses concerning the problematic impact of resource wealth on 
development.  Section 2  briefly outlines  the resource curse (RCH) and dutch disease 
(DDH) hypotheses and links them to aspects  of the behaviour of the NBTT.  Section 
3 presents  a sketch of Jamaica’s trade structure to confirm its commodity 
concentration and to support the view that the islands economic performance will be 
highly susceptible to shocks to its terms of trade.  Section 4, examines  the behaviour  
and the  adjustment processes of the NBTT.  The econometric investigation reveals 
that  shocks generally have little persistence, but the large the positive price shocks of 
the mid 1970’s  marked a clear shift  in the underlying behaviour of the NBTT.  
Section 5 concludes by  considering  how this picture  might be associated with a  
form of induced dutch disease.     
 
2.   Perspectives on Resources and Development 
 
The consensus of the  literature is that weak performance by a resource rich mineral 
economy could be a reflection of two apparently related phenomena  which  condemn 
the well endowed to a scenario of underperformance and growth failure. The RCH 
may be  associated with a  long run  pessimism  while the DDH focuses on  short term 
windfall effects and the failure to benefit from positive terms of trade shocks. 
(Roemer, 1985, Auty, 1993) 
 
The resource curse hypothesis is concerned with the observation that less endowed 
economies such as Korea, Taiwan  have broken into self sustained growth and 
structural change while in comparison, the  resource rich economies have had weak 
long run performance ( Auty, 1998  Auty and Mikesell, 2000, Sachs and Warner, 
1995).  The RCH with its concern over secular growth failure when compared to 
dissimilar economies should be evident in an overall negative trend in NBTT. 
 
In contrast, when seeking to explain Jamaica’s weakness within the context of a 
relevant ‘growth club’, DDH with its country specific focus on shocks and responses 
would seem more relevant.  The DDH identifies adverse effects that positive export 
shocks may impose if policy responses fail take account of persistence.  The windfall 
may be generated either by price or production shocks, although the majority of 
shocks come through prices which are characterised by significant instability. 
(Deaton,  1999).   The DDH  is associated with high but temporary export earnings 
which yield a foreign exchange windfall and constitute a shock to the economy.    The 
‘disease’ then refers to the   crowding out of the non boom traded-good sector as 
resources move into the boom sector or into non-tradeables.   Corden  (1984), Corden 
& Neary, (1982) remain the standard model   arguing that  export price and revenue 
booms create  resource movement and spending effects causing  appreciation of the 
currency and therefore  subjecting  domestic producers of non boom tradeables to 
more intense competition 
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Resource movements involve transfers into the booming sector, which (assuming 
tight markets) create  shortages of labour and capital and may therefore put upward 
cost pressures into the economy.  Labour demand and local linkages from mineral 
resource sectors are notoriously low ( Baldwin, 1966, Hirschmann, 1958, Girvan,  
1967,  Horesh, 1985).  A  consequence of such weak linkage is that these  economies 
are more susceptible to the spending effect, created by increased public and private 
earnings which raise demand for non-traded goods.  Both effects generate domestic 
inflationary pressures and  tend to result in overvaluation of the real exchange rate.  In 
the true DD it is the windfall/shock not just the long run production specialisation 
structure which sets off the adjustment process (Cook & Sieper 1984, Gelb, 1988). 
 
The dutch disease debate focuses on countries’ failure to reap the benefits of  a 
positive economic shock.   Gelb (1988) presents comparative country cases to support 
the view that a beneficial  outcome is  dependent  on the adoption of  policies 
appropriate to the duration of the shock. The key rule derived is that temporary shocks 
should be sterilised.  Such sterilisation should render an inter-temporal consumption 
smoothing effect, so preventing a windfall from creating exchange rate  pressures. 
 
Although the resources in development literature often elides the DDH &RCH, the 
above discussion suggests a need to distinguish between them as DD should be 
manageable by corrective treatment appropriate to the persistence of shock effects 
(van Wijnbergen, 1984).  This paper  develops the view that susceptibility to DD  can 
be identified by size and persistence of shocks,  and therefore examines the evidence 
for shock persistence in NBTT.  This should offer an indicator of susceptibility and  
thereby provide useful information for policy choices.  
 
 By examining Jamaica’s NBTT for shock persistence this paper considers whether 
some of  the economic collapse of the last 25 years might be attributed to a form of 
DD. 
 
3.  Tarnishing of the Jewel. 
 
Jamaica is a small trade-dependent economy that  has operated with a large and  
increasing trade deficit (Table 1 and Fig 1).  The economy was always  resource 
dependent  but  has switched from being  crop to mineral driven.   The outcome is that 
the dominant economic sector  operates  as  an enclave with minimal direct  local 
linkages (Girvan 1967).   The mineral sector’s local  engagement has been  primarily  
through financial channels:  provision of foreign exchange and  fiscal contributions 
(royalties, taxes and special levy).  In fiscal year 1995/6 the bauxite industry  taxes 
and production levy contributed 10% of total government revenue (IMF 1999).  This 
significant and direct impact on state finances,  makes  expectations about the 
industry’s performance  a vital component in  government policy plans.   
 
Table 2 shows an  economy with a clear commodity-dominated structure.   With this 
compounded by the  budgetary dominance of  the bauxite sector,  movements in the 
terms of trade are a crucial determinant of  aggregate performance and  the general 
picture  makes Jamaica   a prime  candidate for DD problems associated with the 
resource windfalls of the 1970’s 
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Table 1 Imports  and Exports as percentage of Jamaican GDP. 
 
 
EXPORT: GDP 
% 
IMPORT: GDP 
% 
1960 33.24 38.05 
1970 33.23 37.42 
1975 35.26 45.61 
1976 29.05 37.89 
1980 51.07 51.04 
1990 51.96 56.08 
1998 49.32 62.42 
 
Source WDI  2000 
 
Figure 1 
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Source WDI  2000 
 
Table 2: Economic Contributions of Major Items of Traditional Exports (1997) 
 
 % share of Exports
Year 1972 1997 
Aluminium 40.98 48.20 
Bauxite 23.38 5.38 
Banana 4.05 3.38 
Sugar 11.53 7.46 
   
 Export as % GDP 
Aluminium 9.93 10.44 
Bauxite 5.67 1.16 
Banana 0.98 0.73 
Sugar 2.80 1.62 
Source: Statistical Yearbook.Jamaica. 
 4
4.    The Behaviour of  Terms of Trade in  Jamaica 
 
Empirical investigations of  terms of trade have principally focused on commodity 
terms of trade and whether there is evidence of  secular decline in accordance with 
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (Powell, 1991, Leon & Soto, 1997,  Sappsford,  1985, 
1988,  Bleaney & Greenaway, 1993) or they have used cross section studies to 
investigate the link between the CTT and country growth  (Auty & Mikesell,  2000, 
Ranis, 1991, Sachs & Warner, 1995, 1997, Gylfasson (2000 ), Gylfasson & Zoega 
(1997).      Investigating the impact of  shocks  on economic performance requires an 
account of country-specific effects and a  recognition  that if windfalls have short-run 
impacts  on expenditure and growth, these  will be particularly  important where there 
is growth feedback  and hence path dependence  
 Cashin & Portillo (2000) investigated the behaviour of NBTT for a number of 
African economies and found that the persistence effect of shocks to NBTT is 
variable between countries. This section investigates the behaviour of Jamaica’s 
NBTT and  generally follows the methodology of  Cashin & Portillo. The discussion 
is then extended to consider feedback mechanisms and whether the behaviour of 
NBTT offers evidence for a  trend decline associated with  RC or shock effects which 
might generate DD. 
 
Fig 2  Graph of log(NBTT) Base 1985 
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Source: World Bank 1995 & Data Stream, for discussion of  construction see 
Appendix.   
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The graph indicates that Jamaica’s NBTT had three phases: i)  relative stability 1960-
74, ii) a major positive shock in 1974/5, iii)  a  period of secular decline after the 
windfall shock of 1975.  In view of  the probable structural break, the investigation of 
the behaviour of NBTT was conducted first for the entire sample period, and then for 
the two sub-periods (excluding the windfall shock of 1975). 
 
The descriptive statistics for NBTT suggest that normality cannot be  rejected (JB 
statistic 1.88),  but  that the distribution may be mildly leptokurtic (Kurtosis 3.67),  
indicating that large shocks are more frequent than might be expected.  If this is the 
case it is important to investigate the persistence of such shocks, which if short lived  
should be met by policies designed to sterilise their short term impact. 
 
The question of shocks was investigated by looking at the time series autoregressive 
characteristics of NBTT.   Initial examination of the graph of NBTT, suggested that 
1975 was a significant outlier and that there was a structural break in the underlying 
behaviour around this point.  In view of this feature it was not appropriate to 
undertake standard Dickey Fuller tests, rather the autoregressive relationship was 
estimated with a dummy to take account of the 1975 outlier.  The form of the general 
equation was   
1 75t tn n t D        te
t
 
Where n : log net barter terms of trade 
t : time trend 
D : dummy for 1975 outlier 
 
Estimating this for the data set 1960- 1999 yielded:  
 
1 751.91 0.62 0.56 0.01t tn n D     
 t       4.10     6.80            5.67            3.75 
se      0.47     0.09            0.10            0.002 
 
R2  = 0.90 
SER = 0.097 
DW =  2.48 
The coefficients were examined first for significance and then for evidence of 
persistence.  The t statistics shown above,  indicated that all coefficients were 
significantly different from zero, and the DW suggested there was no significant 
residual autocorrelation.  In this context persistence was investigated by a t test for 
H0:  = 1.   This gave t=4.02 and  hence strongly rejected the existence of a unit root 
and problems of infinite persistence. 
 
The S.E. of the regression was 0.10 indicating  that one third of the time the NBTT  is 
hit by shocks of  more than 10% 
 
With the autoregressive coefficient   , the impulse response function is   
 
ˆ 0.62 
(IRF



 


 
the Cumulative response ,  1(1 )CIR     =  2.86 
and the Half Life of a Shock (time before half of shock is dissipated) 
 HLS = (log(1/ 2) / logABS  ) = 1.6yrs 
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It appears that fitting for the entire period suggests a relationship with a downward 
trend, a response to shocks which demonstrates finite persistence and  a relatively 
small  cumulative response of 2.86. 
 
Investigating the Structural Break 
 
The underlying equation   
 
1t tn n t      te
t
t
 
 
was estimated for the two sub periods 1960-74  and 1976-1999,  the periods being 
defined by  the visually identified break in 1975: 
 
1960-74 
 
1ˆ 6.76 0.38 0.007t tn n     
 t      (4.62)      (1.28)             (1.63) 
s.e   (1.46)      (0.30)            (0.004) 
 
R2  = 0.21 
SER = .059 
RSS = .038 
DW = 1.93 
 
1976 – 1999 
 
1ˆ 6.28 0.11 0.05t tn n     
t        (7.21)    (0.72)           (6.69) 
s.e.   (0.78)      (0.15)         (0.007) 
 
R2  = 0.94 
SER = .070 
RSS = .104 
DW = 1.67 
 
Since the variances in the two sub periods are not significantly different, it was valid 
to undertake an F test for a  structural break between the two periods.  where  
Residual Sum of Squares: (1960-99), S0 = .633, (1960-74 ),  S1 = .038, 
(1976-99)  S3 = .104,  k= 3  (number of parameter), n1=  14,   n 2 = 24 
 
F3,32 = 4.6,   F*1%  = 4.5, hence rejecting structural stability. 
 
The result show, firstly that the evidence supports  a structural break in 1975,  the F 
test strongly rejects  stability, and secondly that by splitting into the two sub periods   
AR coefficients  are insignificant, so that fluctuations are essentially white noise 
implying  no shock persistence.  
 
These results accord with the visual impression that for: 
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1960-1974 there is a simple white noise process   t tn e 
1976-2001 there is white noise with trend   t tn t    e
 
Allowing for the structural break appears to remove the autoregressive relationship 
and the consistent negative trend.  The trend behaviour  appears as an after effect of 
shock and would seem to reflect DD rather than simple RC problems.  The absence of 
an AR relationship means absence of persistence so that corrective policy responding  
to a positive shock would do best to assume  its temporary nature and seek to spread 
the  windfall, rather than allowing it to create a major injection and structural changes.   
 
Investigating the Adjustment Process 
 
The conventional consensus is that policy choices need to take account of the degree 
and persistence of shocks, and  the evidence reviewed for Jamaica  indicates that 
terms of trade shocks are not persistent.   To understand the implications of  shocks  
more fully  requires discussion of  the feedback mechanisms  by which the NBTT is 
adjusted to its long run equilibrium. 
 
The NBTT is constructed from the ratio of unit values of exports to unit value of 
imports and it is the behaviour of these underlying series which contributes  both 
shocks to, and adjustment of the NBTT.  From Figure 3 it appears that both import 
and export unit values experienced a significant upward adjustment in the mid- 1970’s 
followed by a return to relative stability from the early  1980s.    The import index has 
a steady upward adjustment throughout the 1970’s, and then settles on a relatively 
stable but higher level, while the export index shows a much sharper adjustment in 
1975/6 and then continues to exhibit large oscillations. 
 
Figure 3 
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Source : UNCTAD: Handbook of Statistics. 
 
The detailed feedback process can be examined by using the identity 
 8
 n =  x – m + r 
where all values are  expressed as log. 
x - unit price of exports 
m – unit price of imports. 
r – measurement error – explicit allowance was required because of the problems with 
the published NBTT data as discussed in the data appendix.   
 
Testing the import and export unit value series for 1960-99 shows  both indices to be  
I(1).  The Johansen test reported in Table 3,  shows  a single significant co-integrating 
relation and a coefficient on the import index of  (- 0.94), not significantly different 
from (-1),  therefore suggests a virtual one to one long run relationship. (The 
coefficient is significantly different from zero, but is not significantly different 
from 1).   Hence the co-integrating  relation  is : xt -  mt   where   = - 0.94 not 
significantly different from –1.   The VECM  specified  below is used  to  investigate 
feedback processes,  the structure imposes = -1,  so that the error correction term  
(zt ) becomes: 
 
 zt = xt  - mt  ( which is log of NBTT - nt) 
 
The Johansen adjustment coefficients show greater adjustment by export rather than 
import value, with  62% of deviation from long run equilibrium of export value 
corrected in next period and about  7% , of deviation from equilibrium value of 
imports 
 
Table 3:  Johansen Co-integration Results 
 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Error 
Ln xt 1.00  
Ln mt -0.94 0.034 
Adjustment Coefficients   
ln xt -0.62 0.17 
 ln mt 0.07 0.12 
 
 
Investigation of shocks examined the autoregressive structure of  the NBTT , and 
found that while there was weak persistence and a negative trend for a long period 
1960-98,  when   account was taken of the  structural shift  the two sub periods  gave a 
process for NBTT :   
1960- 1974   t tn e 
1976-2001  t tn t    e
5D
D
D
To investigate the feedback the restriction  = 1 was imposed on VECM so that the 
error correction term corresponds to the NBTT.  The estimated VECM imposing 
restriction and allowing for  measurement error 
1 1 1 1 1 75
2 2 1 2 2 7
3 3 1 3 3 75
4 4 1 4 4 75
t t
t t
t t
t t
x n t D
m n t
n n t
r n t
   
   
   
   




    
    
    
    
   
 9
 
The estimated equation for nt   can also be written in  level form  as originally 
estimated in  equation (1), as 
3 3 1 3 7(1 )t tn n t        5D  
From the adjustment information in the co-integration test the expectation is that 
and large, while and  small. 
 
 These equations were estimated for the full sample and the two sub- periods, with the 
results shown. 
The legitimacy of the  restriction   = 1 was checked  by examining the consistency 
of  coefficient estimates in the different equations.  By the adding up properties of 
least squares estimates then 	
	
 , 	
these hold 
for all the sub periods,  as shown in the results tables below. 
 
Table 4 shows that trends in export and import unit values  are small, but contribute to 
a small overall negative trend in NBTT.  Most of the feedback comes from exports . 
The measurement error,  r,  has no significant trend or feedback from NBTT 
 
 
Table 4: VECM Results 1960-99 (standard errors  in parentheses) 
 
Variable c Nt-1 T D 
Nt  eq 1.91 * 
(0.46) 
0.62 * 
(0-.09) 
-0.008 * 
(0.002) 
0.56 * 
(0.10) 
x 1.06 
(0.69) 
- 0.21 
(0.14) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
0.54 
(0.15) 
m -.44 
(0.41) 
.10 
(0.08) 
0.0005 
(0.002) 
 
0.02 
(0.09)  
r 0.41 
(0.38) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
 
0.03 
(0.08) 
n 1.91 * 
0.47 
 
-0.39* 
(0.09) 
-0.008* 
(.002) 
 
0.56* 
(0.10) 
Consistency check for imposed constraint. coefficients 
	
 1.91    
	
  -.39   
	
   -.008  
	
    -.55 
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Table 5:  !960-74 
 
Variable c Nt-1 T 
Coefficient 
LNBTT eq 
6.76    * 
(1.46) 
-.38 
(0.29) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
x 8.41  * 
(2.2) 
-1.74 * 
(0.44) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
 
m 
2.59 
(1.72) 
-0.54 
(0.35) 
0.01* 
(0.005) 
r 0.93 
(0.16) 
-0.19 
(0.16 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
n 6.76* 
(1.46) 
-1.38* 
(0.30) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
Consistency check for imposed constraint. coefficients 
	
 6.75   
	
  -1.39  
	
   .001 
 
 
Table 5 shows that for 1960-74, the trends in export and import values cancel out 
leaving,  an insignificant  negative trend in NBTT.  Most of the feedback comes from 
exports.  The measurement error r has no significant trend or feedback from NBTT 
Table 6: shows that for 1976-99  the negative trend in exports price dominates to 
leave a significant negative  trend in NBTT. Again there is significant  feedback  from 
exports .  The measurement error r has no significant trend or feedback from NBTT 
 
Table 6:  1976-99 
 
Variable c Nt-1 D T 
Coefficient 
LNBTT eq 
6.28* 
(0.92) 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
 -0.05 * 
(0.007) 
x 4.52 * 
(1.63) 
-0.78 * 
(0.28) 
 -0.03 * 
(0.01) 
m -0.14 
(0.85) 
0.05 
(0.17) 
 -0.002) 
r 1.61 
(1.28) 
-0.28 
(0.22) 
 -0.01 
(0.01) 
n 6.28* 
(0.92) 
-1.1* 
(0.16) 
 -0.05* 
(0.007) 
Consistency check for imposed constraint. coefficients 
	
 6.27    
	
  -1.1   
	
    -0.04 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The econometric story for NBTT  shows that taking account of the 1975  structural 
break there is no evidence of shock persistence,  indicating  that in the face of a 
windfall, the ideal  policy response would seek sterilisation and consumption 
spreading.  In the 1970’s the Jamaican government did the opposite, it anticipated 
continuing positive windfalls and further believed that  the government share of these 
would be enhanced by the new bauxite levy . The new revenue source, complemented   
by positive  price shocks for all major exports in 1975 generated overoptimistic 
expectations and the anticipated revenue was committed to a variety of welfare and 
public sector programmes.  The Economic and Social Survey 1974(p.53) states 
” … recurrent expenditure has risen more rapidly than revenue.  However the 
government as a major part of fiscal policy has imposed a production levy (7.5% of 
realised price of primary aluminium on all bauxite mined in Jamaica).  The levy is 
expected to raise $194m for the period to march 1975 to finance the shortfall.”   The  
realised levy income for 1975 was  J$133.8m,  (Economic & Social Survey 1978) 
Government plans clearly  incorporated an  optimistic  view on the size and  
persistence of the windfalls:  In three years 1975-78   government  expenditure 
increased  from 31% to 38% of GDP  and  within this total  capital expenditure fell 
from 27 to 22% . However the basis for this rosy scenario quickly evaporated as 
commodity prices fell and the NBTT went into reverse.  The income fall was 
compounded by the  bauxite companies registering their aversion to the levy by 
shifting  production, so that Jamaica’s output fell 35% from 1974-76 and its  share in 
world production fell from 19% in 1974 to 13% in 1976 with Australia stepping into 
the breach (world market share increased from 13-19%). 
 
The spending and its pattern channelled funds towards non-tradeables, accelerating 
domestic inflation  and consequently increasing pressures on the real exchange rate, 
as shown in figure 4.  The real exchange rate  increased by 44% from 1974-77, but 
was then checked by a series of nominal devaluations from 1978.    The problem 
therefore manifested in severe instability of the real exchange as devaluations 
struggled to keep pace with escalating domestic costs.  The outcome had all the 
symptoms of   dutch disease rather than a simple resource curse problem  
 
 Figure 4 
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Source: data stream and WDI 
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Data Note:  Real Exchange Rate calculated :   
(Index Jamaican Exchange rate)* (US GDP Deflator / Jamaica GDP Deflator) 
All in index form base year 1995, exchange rate LCU/US$. 
Rise  in the index represent devaluation of RER 
 
Appendix : Data Note on NBTT 
 
The analysis is based on annual data on Net Barter Terms of Trade (NBTT) for the 
period 1960-1999 for Jamaica..  NBTT are calculated as the ratio of an index of a  
country’s export prices to an index of  import prices. (The NBTT may be calculated in 
US $ or local currency units ).  NBTT measures the purchasing capacity of a unit of 
exports and is an important determinant of macroeconomic performance for any small 
commodity dependent economy. 
 
To consider the external shocks to the Jamaican economy requires a long data series 
to capture the  structural shift from sugar to bauxite dependent exporter which 
occurred  from 1960.  The Terms of Trade series proved difficult to obtain .  The 
World Banks Data Base (WDI) provides NBTT data in its 1995 edition but has 
subsequently ceased to do so.  In order to incorporate performance through the 1990’s 
it was therefore necessary to consider how to extend the series. 
 
Data was sought from the Jamaican Statistical Institute Publications: Statistical 
Yearbook, Statistical Abstract and Bulletin of External Trade .  The problem with 
these sources were first that the recent 2000 Yearbook only provided NBTT to 1989 
and second the yearbooks only  provided sequences of  relatively short term series  
(max 10 years which were often subject to revision)  so that repeated splicing would 
be required to construct a long series. These publication were however useful in that 
they provided information on the index calculated in both US $ or local currency (J$) 
units. Ideally the two should be similar, and examination of the two revealed a close 
match with just occasional disturbances.  This evidence was helpful since neither the 
WDI series 1960-93 nor the Data stream series (1983-2001) explicitly stated the 
currency of the underlying prices.2  Although these two series were not identical in 
their overlap period, their pattern was similar. (See Figure 5).  Since the Data Stream 
information is most recent it is assumed that it has incorporated most corrections and 
updates, it is therefore used as the series from 1983.  The WDI series was rebased 
from 1987 to 1985 this provided a spliced series from 1960-2001. 
 
                                                 
2 Data stream information service indicated that their series was based on local currency. 
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